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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Did this Court properly conclude that Mr. Sampson's rights
against self incrimination were violated when police
officers failed to clarify his equivocal reference to
counsel while undergoing custodial interrogation?

Is the exclusionary rule properly applied to the
circumstances of the police misconduct in this case?
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

ANSWER TO STATE'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Case No. 890327-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Sampson was charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder in
the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

Prior to trial, he filed a

motion to suppress statements and evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda and fifth amendment protections.

The trial court denied the

motion, and Defendant was ultimately convicted at a jury trial held
September 22-30, 1987, in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, Judge,
presiding.

That judge sentenced Mr. Sampson to a term of five years

to life in the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Sampson appealed, alleging eight errors requiring
reversal of the conviction.

This Court heard that appeal and, on

September 11, 1990, issued an opinion addressing but one issue, the
violation of Mr. Sampson's protections against self-incrimination,
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.

State v.

Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 9/11/90); See opinion

attached at Addendum A.

The State filed a Petition for Rehearing of

that decision and this Court invited Mr, Sampson to respond to the
State's Petition.
At the filing of this Answer, Mr. Sampson remains
incarcerated at the State Prison, the trial court having refused to
this point to hear his Application for Certificate of Probable Cause.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Sampson included within his opening brief a detailed
rendition of the facts in this case.

The Court's opinion similarly

sets forth the facts pertinent to this Answer.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court properly decided that Mr. Sampson's conviction
required reversal in light of improper tactics by police in
continuing to interrogate him without clarifying his equivocal
reference to an attorney to assist him.

The State waived the

opportunity to argue that the second set of Miranda warnings after
Mr. Sampson had taken the police to recover the dead child's body
cleansed the taint of the prior impropriety; and in any event, that
premise is erroneously proposed under the guiding case law.
The exclusionary rule is properly invoked in the context
of the Fifth Amendment violations concerning the right to have
counsel assist during custodial interrogations when those rights are
violated by improper police tactics.
- 2

-

ARGUMENT
The State's Petition for Rehearing asserts that this
Court misapprehended the law when ruling that the police officers7
failure to properly clarify Mr. Sampson's equivocal reference for an
attorney required suppression of statements and evidence mandating
reversal of his conviction and a remand for new trial.
Specifically, the State complains that this Court's
decision failed to consider that a subsequent set of Miranda
warnings offered by police after Mr. Sampson already directed
authorities to the body of his dead child somehow removed the taint
from the concededly violative prior attempt to adequately and
effectively alert Mr. Sampson to his rights against
self-incrimination, particularly the right to have legal counsel
present to assist him in dealing with custodial interrogation by the
police.

State's Petition at 5-14.
Additionally, the State urges that the body of the child

is nonetheless admissible despite the violation of the protection
against self-incrimination.
It is the State's position on rehearing, not this Court's
opinion, which misapprehends the law.

The Petition accordingly

should be denied.

- 3
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POINT I. MR. SAMPSONS RIGHTS AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION AS OUTLINED IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
AND AS PROTECTED BY MIRANDA WERE VIOLATED AND
REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
A.

WAIVER

The State concedes, consistent with Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91 (1984), and State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App.
1988), that Sergeant Elliott and Sheriff Hayward neglected to follow
proper requirements to clarify the equivocal reference to counsel
made by Mr. Sampson prior to the polygraph examination.
Petition at 10-11.

State's

For the first time now on Petition for

Rehearing, however, the State contends this error is rendered
harmless and otherwise is cured by supposed proper Miranda warnings
given after Mr. Sampson responded that he knew the whereabouts of
Miyako and then directed authorities to the dead body of the child.
State's Petition at 13-14.
This Court has previously ruled that the State is
precluded from raising issues such as these for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah App. 1990),

cert, denied No. 900238 (Utah 10/23/90).

This Court recognized in

its opinion that the State neglected to present this argument
before, now raising if for the first time in its Petition for
Rehearing.
9/11/90).

Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 20 n.14 (Utah App.
Accordingly, the same rationale from Marshall in support

of waiver must apply in the context of petitions for rehearing where
the issues were not raised by the State earlier.

- A

-

B.

SUBSEQUENT MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE ALSO IMPROPER
AND VIOLATIVE OR MR. SAMPSON'S RIGHTS.

The State heavily relies on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985), for its proposition that subsequent warnings and
interrogation salvage the impropriety of the first warnings.
State's Petition at 5-9, 12-13, 15-18.

An excerpt cited by the

State from the decision in Oregon v. Elstad best divulges the
State's analytical error.
We must conclude that, absent deliberately
coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect
has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion. A subseguent
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect
who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions
that precluded admission of the earlier statement.
470 U.S. at 314 (cited in State's Petition at 8-9) (emphasis added).
In this case now on review, improper tactics and/or
coercive tactics occurred as this Court ruled in its opinion,
Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, 18, 20 n.14, in that Sergeant
Elliott and Sheriff Hayward never qualified the equivocal reference
to counsel as required by Smith v. Illinois and State v. Griffin.
Accordingly, the State cannot claim that the statements and evidence
flowing from the Smith/Griffin error are voluntary, knowing and
intelligent on the part of Mr. Sampson.
- 5
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Neither can the State

support its burden to indicate a valid waiver of Mr, Sampson's right
to counsel as guaranteed by the fifth amendment as this Court also
ruled.

Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16-18.
This case is not like Elstad where the defendant had not

been warned before the initial statement.

Here, Mr. Sampson was

warned but then the officer effectively withdrew the warning and
encouraged Mr. Sampson to continue without the benefit of counsel,
rather than clarify the equivocal reference regarding the assistance
of counsel.

These distinctions render Elstad of little value to the

resolution of this case.
Another case heavily relied on by the State is Martin v.
Wainwriqht, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 479 U.S. 909
(1986), modified in part, 781 P.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1986).

State's

Petition 11-13, 15. The State relies on Martin because there the
court examined an equivocal request to cut off questioning, i.e.,
invocation of the right to remain silent, by deciding that while the
confession which followed was inadmissible because the police failed
to clarify the request, that nonetheless a subsequent proper warning
under Miranda resulted in the admission of the first confession as
harmless error.

State's Petition at 11-12.

The State argues that

this case supports its position because the Fifth Amendment's
companion right to have an attorney present during questioning
should be handled in similar fashion after an equivocal invocation
- 6
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of that right as occurred in this case.

State's Petition at 13-14.

The State's reasoning is faulty, however, and contrary to United
States Supreme Court authority.
In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), a decision
subsequent to both Oregon v. Elstad and Martin v. Wainwriqht, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), holding that once a suspect has requested the assistance
of counsel in dealing with custodial interrogation, police may not
interrogate him on that charge or any other charge without first
supplying counsel as requested or without the accused, not police,
initiating the questioning.

486 U.S. at 685-86.

In so ruling the

United States Supreme Court also reiterated an earlier principle
overlooked by the State in its petition.

The Roberson Court, citing

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101 n.7 (1975), reminded that a
clear distinction exists between a suspect's decision to cut off
questioning and the same suspect's request for the assistance of
counsel.

486 U.S. at 683.
While Mosley held that police must immediately cease the

interrogation once the right to cut off questioning has been
asserted, that opinion also permitted police to resume interrogation
after the passage of a significant time period and after providing a
fresh set of Miranda warnings.

423 U.S. at 106.

The Roberson Court

rejected that same position regarding the request for assistance of
counsel.

Regarding the right to have counsel present during

questioning the Court adhered to the "bright-line" rule of Edwards
- 7
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that interrogation must immediately cease and may not resume even
after an extended period of time and even with new Miranda warnings
unless the attorney is provided or the accused initiates the
questioning.

486 U.S. at 682.

The rationale for treating the two fifth amendment
safeguards distinct was explained as follows:
The rule in Miranda . . . was based on
this Court's perception that the lawyer
occupies a critical position in our legal
system because of his unique ability to
protect the fifth amendment rights of a
client undergoing custodial
interrogation. Because of this special
ability of the lawyer to help the client
preserve his fifth amendment rights once
the client becomes enmeshed in the
adversary process, the Court found that
"the right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the fifth amendment
privilege under the system" established by
the Court.
486 U.S. at 682-83 n.4 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719
(1979)).

Accordingly, the State is wrong when arguing that the

analysis in Martin v. Wainwright should guide this Court on
rehearing.
The equivocal nature of the invocation of the right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation must not draw
this Court away from the Edwards and Roberson decisions.

The

Supreme Court's direction in those cases indicate proper attention
should be placed on a defendant's request for counsel and in light
of his feeling of inadequacy to deal with custodial interrogation
without the assistance of counsel.
- 8

Additionally, this Court must
-

also be cognizant that the United States Supreme Court has also
mandated that the balancing of this question should always be in
favor of the defendants.

See# e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 4 30 U.S.

387, 404 (1977) (when examining alleged waiver of right to counsel,
courts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver).

POINT II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS PROPERLY
APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
When Detective Judd re-Mirandized Mr. Sampson, he did so
in violation of Miranda and his fifth amendment rights against self
incrimination, particularly the right to have counsel assist in
custodial interrogation.

Because neither Sgt. Elliott nor Sheriff

Hayward clarified the equivocal reference to counsel asserted by Mr.
Sampson, their interrogations were in violation of the protections
discussed in Point I above.

Because an attorney was not supplied to

Mr. Sampson and because he did not initiate questioning, the
interrogation by Detective Judd was also fatally flawed despite new
Miranda warnings.
The State's assertion, then, that this interrogation
session by Detective Judd cured the prior tainted statements and
evidence is without merit.

The resulting conclusion reached by the

State that the body of the dead child is admissible is also
incorrect.

- 9
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In its opinion in this case, this Court properly relied
on Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for the premise that the
exclusionary rule is applicable in this case.

In Nix v. Williams,

the United States Supreme Court indicated:
The court rationale consistently advanced
by this Court for extending the
exclusionary rule to evidence that is the
fruit of unlawful police conduct has been
that this admittedly drastic and socially
costly course is needed to deter police
from violations of constitutional and
statutory protections. This Court has
accepted the argument that the way to
ensure such protections is to exclude
evidence seized as the result of such
violations notwithstanding the high social
costs of letting persons obviously guilty
go unpunished for their crimes.
467 U.S. at 442.

In so delineating the rational of the exclusionary

rule, the Court in Nix v. Williams pointed out that the exclusionary
rule has not been limited to a fourth amendment analysis but has
also been applied by the United States Supreme Court where the
violations were of the sixth amendment as well as the fifth
amendment as involved in this case.

Id. at 442, 442 n.3.

The cases

cited by the State in Point II of its petition are without
significance because they rely on a faulty premise of a proper
second interrogation conducted by Detective Judd contrary to the law
and facts.

Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's

Petition.

- 10 -

POINT III. THE REMAINING ISSUES ADVANCED BY
MR, SAMPSON REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
Mr. Sampson reminds this Court that in considering the
Stated Petition for Rehearing seven issues briefed by him on appeal
remain unaddressed by this Court.

If this Court should decide to

grant rehearing on the issue of the violation of his Miranda and
fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, Mr. Sampson
requests this Court to also address those issues which remain and to
reverse his conviction on the grounds stated therein.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Sampson respectfully requests that this Court deny
the State's Petition for Rehtearing.
DATED this

/ """ day of November, 1990.

- 11 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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Provo, Utah
143 Utah Adv. Ren. 9
chance I get when I can prove it." Finally he stated:
Cite as
"Oh usually in the summer we will write ... one or
143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
two a month I guess." This unrebutted testimony
suggests that officers in the area routinely stop
drivers for following too closely. See United States
IN THE
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988)
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
(distinguishing routine stops from pretext stops).
Defendants failed to produce any contradictory
STATE of Utah,
evidence and in the absence of such evidence, the
Plaintiff and Appellee,
stop appears to have been valid.
v.
To support their pretext argument, defendants cite
Carlos
R.
SAMPSON,
State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1990). In ArDefendant and Appellant.
royo, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's determination that a stop was a pretext to
No. 890327-CA
search for drugs. Id. at 15. The alleged violation in
that case was also following too closely. However,
FILED: September 11, 1990
that case is readily distinguishable. First, the trial
court found that no violation had occurred because Third District, Salt Lake County
the vehicle was traveling approximately nine car The Honorable David S. Young
lengths behind the car in front. Id. at 18 n.14.
Second, the officer's testimony clearly indicated ATTORNEYS:
that the purpose for the stop was to investigate a Andrew A. Valdez, Elizabeth A. Bowman,
suspicion wholly unrelated to the alleged violation. Id.
and Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for
The stop in Arroyo is a classic pretext stop.
Appellant
The undisputed facts in this case indicate that
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt
defendants' automobile was traveling 65 miles an
hour and one-and-a-half car lengths behind the
Lake City, for Appellee
car in front. These facts present a clear violation of
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62
(1988). Moreover, the undisputed facts do not Orme.
suggest that the officer had any other purpose for
stopping the vehicle except to issue a citation for ORME, Judge:
following too closely and for failure to wear seatbDefendant appeals his conviction for crimelts. The facts in this case simply do not indicate
inal
homicide, murder in the second degree, a
that the stop was "a pretext to search for evidence
first degree felony in violation of Utah Code
of a more serious crime." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the stop Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). We reverse and
was proper appears to be correct.
remand for a new trial.
11. The trial court's inadequate findings also placed
On November 24, 1986, at approximately
appellate counsel at a disadvantage in framing and
10:30 p.m., defendant entered a 7-Eleven
developing their arguments on appeal. Both sides
store in Salt Lake County and told the clerks
recognized this difficulty at oral argument and both
sides suggested remand for more detailed findings as that his daughter had been kidnapped. He
an appropriate remedy. By subsequent correspond- asked them to call the police, which they did.
Deputies from the Salt Lake County
ence, defendants have taken the position that Sfare
v. Robinson, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Ct. App. Sheriff's Office responded. Defendant info1990), makes remand unnecessary and entitles them
rmed them that his daughter had been abduto reversal. We are not persuaded. Review of the cted from his truck. He gave them a descripRobinson opinion confirms that the trial court in tion of his daughter and a photograph. The
that case made adequate, detailed findings that officers investigated the alleged kidnapping
facilitated meaningful appellate review of the trial
until 4:00 a.m. At some point during the
court's legal conclusions.

evening, defendant was informed the police
did not believe his story. The officers asked
defendant to come to headquarters the following morning for a polygraph examination.
He agreed.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on November
25, defendant arrived at police headquarters.
He was met by the polygraph examiner, Sergeant Elliot, who had been briefed about the
events which occurred on the prior evening.
Defendant was escorted to a small interrogation room, hooked up to a polygraph
machine, and instructed about how polygraph
machines worked. Sgt. Elliot then explained
the purpose for giving defendant the test. He
said:
When we walk out of here we ought
to be able to tell the detectives

13
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Carlos is truthful when he says the
child was taken out of the truck, he
had not prearranged with anyone to
take the child. Uh, also, Carlos is
not involved in the death of the
child if the child is, in fact, dead.
And, uh, those are the two things
that we will accomplish today.1
After explaining to defendant the purpose
of the test, Sgt. Elliot gave defendant the Miranda warnings. He began by stating:
" Because you are in the cop shop there is no
doubt in your mind that this is the police
station and, uh, because you are in taking a
polygraph from a law enforcement agency I
must advise you of your rights again."2 After
reading defendant each of his rights, the following exchange ensued:
Elliot: Okay, having these rights in
mind do you wish to talk to me
now.
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not
worried about anything, it is just
that....
Elliot: Okay, if you are not worried
about anything I would say that is
fine, let's go ahead and proceed.
Let's get this thing done and get it
over with and see what we can do.
Sampson: I'm willing to get it over
with.
Defendant then read and signed a form listing
his Miranda rights and indicating his willingness to take the polygraph test.
During the polygraph examination, Sgt.
Elliot asked defendant whether he arranged
the disappearance or caused the death of his
child and whether he knew where she was
hidden.3 He asked defendant this series of
questions four times. To the question concerning where his daughter was hidden, defendant responded in the negative each time and
each time the polygraph suggested a deceitful
response. After the last set of questions, Sgt.
Elliot informed defendant about the test
results. He asked defendant why his response
to the question concerning whether he knew
where his daughter was hidden appeared to be
false. Defendant said he thought maybe the
child's mother had done something with her.
After concluding the examination, Sgt.
Elliot and defendant went to find Salt Lake
County Sheriff Pete Hayward. Sgt. Elliot told
Sheriff Hayward about the test results. He
told him that he believed defendant had been
untruthful and informed him that defendant
had been "Mirandized," but apparently did
not acquaint the sheriff with the particulars of
defendant's responses after his rights had been
read to him.
Sheriff Hayward then returned with defendant to the polygraph room for further questioning. He did not give defendant the

4

Miranda warnings. He informed defendant
that there were inconsistencies in his story and
that he did not believe defendant was telling
the truth. He then asked defendant whether he
had injured his daughter. Ultimately, defendant stated his daughter was dead and that he
could show the police where she was located.
Defendant accompanied Sheriff Hayward
and another deputy to a dumpster in American Fork where his daughter's body was
located. After retrieving the body, the officers
placed defendant under arrest and returned
him to Salt Lake City. When the officers
again met with defendant, defendant was read
his Miranda rights. He agreed to talk with the
investigating officer, who thereafter questioned him concerning the circumstances surrounding his daughter's death.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion
to suppress all statements made by defendant
during and after the polygraph examination on
November 25, 1986, and all evidence derived
as a result of those statements. Counsel argued
that the police officers had violated defendant's Miranda rights by continuing to question him after he made an equivocal request
for counsel. The trial court denied the motion.
In support of its decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress, the court stated in
pertinent part:
The court finds, first, that as you
have agreed, the standard of evidence must be a preponderance of
the evidence5 to establish the voluntariness of the interrogation and
waiver.
Court finds that the defendant
clearly understood what his rights
were and what he was waiving, that
there is nothing in the record to
show that the police did anything or
acted in any way improperly so as
to constitute any kind of coercion6
in this matter so as to cause the
defendant not to fully understand
his rights and to leave him in a
position where he was acting in a
coerced sort of way....
I believe he had an unfettered
right of choice, that he did not
request an attorney, that the language "Well, ah, should I have a
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not
worried about anything, it is just
that ..." is not sufficient to cause
the police to be concerned as to the
claim or any suggestion that the
defendant wished to claim a right to
counsel.
I also find that there was no need
to give continuous advice as to
subsequent requests for the selection
of counsel7 or the waiver of the
same.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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I also find further that the forum
was adequate, the [rights] were
clearly explained to the defendant.
He voluntarily and knowingly
waived his right to counsel and I
cannot find that the motion to
suppress should be granted and,
therefore, it is denied.
A five-day jury trial was held in September
1987. Having lost his motion to suppress,
defendant sought and obtained a continuing
objection to the admission of evidence resulting from the police interrogation. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of second degree homicide. He was
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the
Utah State Prison.
Defendant has raised numerous issues on
appeal, but his primary contention is that the
court committed prejudicial error when it
denied his motion to suppress. Because we
must reverse and remand on this issue, we
need not address the other issues raised by
defendant.
Neither party has identified the standard of
review for this appeal. However, both parties
apparently concede that the trial court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of
defendant's Miranda rights, which conclusions
were based upon essentially undisputed facts,
in particular the transcript of Sgt. Elliot's
colloquy with defendant, present questions of
law reviewable under a correction-of-error
standard. Such a conclusion is consistent with
the general notion that a trial court's
"findings" based upon undisputed facts
present questions of law on appeal. Diversified
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Assoc,
739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting City of Spencer v. Hawkey Sec. Ins.
Co., 216 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974)). Cf.
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie
Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990) (same standard for review of summary
judgment, which necessarily involves undisputed facts). See also People v. Russo, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 1172, 1% Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983)
(where Miranda warnings and ensuing discussion were recorded, facts deemed undisputed
and appellate court required to "independently
assess whether [defendant] knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights"). Thus, we do
not accord any particular deference to the trial
court's conclusions, although couched as
findings, but, rather, review them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985).
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
the United States Supreme Court stated that
"the prosecution may not use statements ...
stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at
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444. One of those procedural safeguards is a
warning that the defendant has the right to an
attorney during custodial interrogation. Id.
Moreover, the Court noted that if defendant
"indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning." Id. at 444-45. Finally, when
custodial interrogation continues without the
presence of a defense attorney and damaging
evidence results from the interrogation, the
state has a heavy burden to show that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights. Id. at 475.
We must address two questions in this
appeal. First, we must determine whether
defendant was subject to "custodial interrogation" at the time he made his incriminating
statements. Second, assuming custodial interrogation, we must determine whether defendant requested, or knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to, counsel.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Initially, defendant claims the state failed to
raise below the issue of whether there actually
was a "custodial interrogation" and thus
should be precluded from arguing on appeal
that there was not. See generally State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). Though we agree the state did not
dwell on the issue, it was sufficiently raised at
the suppression hearing to be preserved for
this appeal. We note, however, that the trial
court did not base its denial of the motion to
suppress upon the lack of custody nor intimate
any doubt that the colloquy between Sgt.
Elliot and defendant occurred in conjunction
with a custodial interrogation. Instead, it
concluded that defendant was informed of his
rights, understood his rights, and voluntarily
waived them-conclusions which would be
irrelevant if the court thought there had been
no custodial interrogation.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme
Court defined "custodial interrogation" as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court
expanded on this definition in Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
"Miranda warnings are required only where
there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" Id. at
495. Later, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983) (per curiam), the Court stated that
"the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is
a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest." Id. at 1125.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that the test is an objective one,
i.e., that "the only relevant inquiry is how a
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reasonable man in the suspect's position concedes that the investigation in this case had
would have understood his situation." Berk- focused exclusively on defendant. Before the
emer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). See, conclusion of the evening when defendant
e.g.. Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 reported the fictitious kidnapping, officers had
(Alaska 1979) (The question is not whether the informed defendant that they did not believe
particular defendant considered himself in his story. As a result of their disbelief, they
custody, but whether a "reasonable person requested defendant to return the following
[under the same circumstances] would feel he morning for a polygraph test. Nothing in the
was not free to leave and break off police record suggests other suspects were sought or
questioning."); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, questioned, or other leads pursued, in the
meanwhile. The questions asked during the
501 P.2d 468, 471 (1972) (en banc).
The Utah Supreme Court has identified polygraph examination clearly indicate a
several key factors to consider in order to strong suspicion that defendant had kidnapped
or killed his own daughter. It is obvious from
determine when a defendant
these facts that defendant was the prime, if
who has not been formally arrested
not exclusive, suspect of the police investigais in custody. They are: (1) the site
tion.
A reasonable person under the circumsof interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation focused on the
accused; (3) whether the objective
. indicia of arrest were present; and
(4) the length and form of interrogation.
Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171
(Utah 1983). Another factor which we find
pertinent to our analysis was recognized by
our Oregon counterpart in State v. Herrera, 49
Or. App. 1075, 621 P.2d 1209 (1980). That
factor is (5) whether the defendant came to the
place of interrogation freely and willingly. Id.
at 1212. We now apply these five factors,
along with the objective standard adopted in
Berkemer, to the undisputed facts in this case.
A brief mention of factors (1), (3) and (5) is
sufficient because we find them relatively
"neutral." Concerning factor (1), the site of
interrogation was the police station. Stationhouse questioning lends itself to a finding of
custody, a concept which Sgt. Elliot recognized in his "cop shop" introductory remark,
although that fact alone is not conclusive. See,
e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. Considering
factor (3), defendant was apparently not securely restrained or told that he was under
arrest until after his daughter's body was
discovered. However, it is pertinent to note
that he was not specifically informed of his
freedom to leave* and that once the polygraph
examination started, he was restrained in the
limited sense that he was hooked to the polygraph machine.9 Turning to factor (5), the
defendant went voluntarily to the police
station after receiving an invitation to do so.
The fact that he went voluntarily, however,
does not mean he was free to leave during the
entire remainder of the interrogation.
The two factors which conclusively tip the
scale and persuade us that defendant was in
custody are factors (2), the focus of the investigation, and (4), the form of the interrogation. The interplay of these two factors at the
time defendant made incriminating statements
would lead a reasonable person to believe that
he was not free to leave.
Concerning factor (2), the state essentially

tances would surely so have concluded, especially given the expressed disbelief at his story.
Finally, factor (4) weighs heavily in favor of
a determination of custody. Utah courts have
placed a great deal of emphasis on the form of
the questioning in these types of cases. As
long as questioning remains merely investigatory, courts have not found custody. See, e.g.,
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986).
However, when investigatory questioning
shifts to accusatory questioning, custody is
likely and Miranda warnings become necessary. Camer, 664 P.2d at 1170. See also Kelly,
718 P.2d at 391. The change from investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the
"police have reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime has been committed and also
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171.
See also Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391.
Assuming, without deciding, that the polygraph examination itself was merely investigatory,10 we find that the questioning became
accusatory when Sgt. Elliot and Sheriff
Hayward determined that defendant had lied
on the exam. The officers knew prior to the
polygraph exam that a crime had been committed. They suspected kidnapping and possibly even murder. Moreover, they clearly suspected defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime. The polygraph exam results merely
confirmed their suspicions. Knowing the suspicions of the police and then being confronted with the polygraph exam results, a reasonable person in defendant's position would
not have considered himself free to leave at
that time.11 Thus, we hold that, at least as of
the time of Sheriff Hayward's questioning of
defendant, defendant was subject to custodial
interrogation and entitled to proper Miranda
warnings.
This case is similar to, and the result we
reach consistent with, the Colorado case of People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468
(1972) (en banc). In Algien, the defendant,
along with other individuals, was suspected of
arson. 501 P.2d at 469. He voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination. Id. At no
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time was he advised of his Miranda rights. Id.
at 470. Prior to the examination he was informed that the purpose of the test was to determine his involvement in the fire. Id. at 46970. He was then asked questions concerning
his guilt. Id. The exam was given three times
and each time the test indicated his negative
responses were not truthful. Id. at 470. At the
conclusion of the test, he was confronted with
the opinion that he was lying and, after discussing the matter, defendant confessed. Id.
The trial court in Algien found that once
the officers concluded defendant was lying
during the exam, the suspicion of guilt focused
on him and the officers should have read him
his Miranda rights. Id. The Colorado Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court and held that
"a reasonable person would with logic conclude that he could not leave the premises of
his own free will but would be detained for
formal arrest." Id. at 471. Consequently, it
affirmed the decision of the trial court to
suppress defendant's confession.
Other courts have applied an A/g/en-type
analysis to post-polygraph confessions. See,
e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d
1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not
advised of their Miranda rights, or do not
properly waive them, confessions elicited after
a polygraph test are typically suppressed.");
People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891, 513
N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession
admissible because defendant appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of
rights before post-polygraph confession). The
rationale of these polygraph cases comports
with our view of custodial interrogation and
thus we adopt their reasoning in this case.
We need not decide whether defendant was
in custody from the inception of the polygraph
examination12 because no confession was elicited until after the exam was completed and
the sheriff summoned. It is sufficient to conclude that, Sgt. Elliot having determined defendant was lying in the exam, Miranda warnings were necessary before further questioning could properly proceed.
It is clear from the record that defendant
was not given Miranda warnings between the
conclusion of the polygraph exam and the
time he was formally arrested.13 Thus, unless
we find that defendant's Miranda rights were
adequately protected by reason of the exchange at the outset of the polygraph examination undertaken by Sgt. Elliot,14 there was no
adequate "Mirandizing" of defendant before
he gave his custodial confession. We now
examine whether defendant validly waived his
Miranda rights at that time.
WAIVER
On appeal, defendant does not argue that
the state failed to adequately inform him of
his Miranda rights. Prior to the polygraph
examination. Sgt. Elliot carefully informed
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defendant of each of his rights. Instead, defendant argues that he made an "equivocal
request" for counsel which the state failed to
clarify and, if appropriate, to honor. It is
telling that the state does not address this issue
on appeal, but instead puts all its eggs in the
"no custodial interrogation" basket. Nonetheless, because the state stops short of conceding the point and in view of its importance,
we will address the issue in some detail.
Initially we note that, though a defendant
may waive his rights to remain silent and to
have an attorney present during custodial
interrogation, "these waivers must be both
intentional and made with full knowledge of
the consequences, and the defendant is given
the benefit of every reasonable presumption
against such a waiver." State v. Fulton, 742
P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484
U.S. 1044 (1988). See also Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). Consequently, the
state has a heavy burden to establish both that
a defendant understood his Miranda rights
and that he voluntarily waived them. State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1986).
The state argued below, and the trial court
found, that defendant's statement "Well, ah,
should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm
really not worried about anything, it is just
that ..." did not qualify as even an equivocal
request for counsel which the police had to be
concerned about. We disagree.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme
Court stated: "If [defendant] indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning." 384
U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added). Thus, a
defendant's "request for counsel may be
ambiguous or equivocal," Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam), and still
qualify as an invocation of Miranda rights.
This court dealt with an equivocal request
for counsel in State v. Griffin, ISA P.2d 965
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Griffin, the defendant stated during interrogation, "This is a lie.
I'm calling an attorney." Id. at 966. We held
that this statement "was arguably equivocal."
Id. at 969. Defendant's statement in this case
was less forceful than that in Griffin.
However, other jurisdictions have found statements very similar to the one in this case to
have constituted equivocal requests for
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry,
733 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Maybe I
should talk to an attorney before I make a
further statement."), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
1056 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d
1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("might want to
talk to a lawye *), cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988); United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.
Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.)
("maybe it would be good to have a lawyer");
Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 618 (Wyo.
iQft^ /aft#»r h*»ine asked if he wanted to talk,
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defendant responded "Well I don't care, I'd
like to see a lawyer, too you know"); Hampel
v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985) ("I've got one question ... [and
the question is concerning a lawyer] ... how
would I be able to get one, a lawyer?"); People
v. Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196
Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) ("I don't know if I
should have a lawyer here or what."); State v.
Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074, 1083
(Ct. App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an attorney");
State v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d
1001, 1003 (1983) ("Do you think I need an
attorney?"). See also United States v. Porter,
764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call
to attorney's office in presence of officer
treated as equivocal request for counsel), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); People v. Quirk,
129 Cal. App. 3d 618, 181 Cal. Rptr. 301, 308
(1982) (inquiry by defendant as to whether
wife had hired an attorney treated as equivocal
request for counsel). We hold that defendant's
statement in this case was of a caliber similar
to those just quoted, and like them, constituted an equivocal request for counsel.15 See also

Comment, Equivocal
Requests
for
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy
Considerations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 770-71
(1987) [hereinafter "The Cincinnati
Comment"] (categorizing recurring types of
equivocal requests for counsel, including as
one category "[i]ndecisive statements that
indicate uncertainty in the suspect's mind
about the need or advisability of obtaining
legal representation").
Courts have developed different standards
to handle equivocal requests for counsel. The
United States Supreme Court identified three
methods for handling equivocal requests in
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n.3
(1984), but declined to identify any of them as
the constitutionally correct one.
Some courts have held that all
questioning must cease upon any
request for or reference to counsel,
however equivocal or ambiguous....
Others have attempted to define a
threshold standard of clarity for
such requests, and have held that
requests falling below this threshold
do not trigger the right to
counsel.... Still others have adopted
a third approach, holding that when
an accused makes an equivocal
statement that "arguably" can be
construed as a request for counsel,
all interrogation must immediately
cease except for narrow questions
designed to "clarify" the earlier
statement and the accused's desires
respecting counsel.
Id. at 96 n.3 (emphasis added). In Griffin, this
court adopted the third approach, holding
"that when an accused makes an arguably
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equivocal request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be
limited to clarifying the request." 754 P.2d at
969. We remain convinced that this middle
approach16 is preferable to either of the two
more extreme positions and note that it is
regarded as the majority view. Note, Judicial
Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for
Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460, 472
(1987) [hereinafter "The Notre Dame Note"].
It is also favored by commentators as the
approach which best balances the interests of
law enforcement and the rights of the accused.
See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel During
Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal References
to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159, 118794 (1986); The Notre Dame Note at 472-73;
The Cincinnati Comment at 783.
Unfortunately, neither Sgt. Elliot nor
Sheriff Hayward attempted to clarify defendant's equivocal reference to an attorney. The
transcript of the polygraph examinationand the actual tape is not part of our recordindicates a pause following defendant's equivocal statements about counsel after which
Sgt. Elliot stated "Okay, if you are not
worried about anything I would say that is
fine, let's go ahead and proceed." Nothing in
this statement by Sgt. Elliot nor any subsequent statement amounts to an effort to clarify
defendant's request. Although, as indicated
previously, the state did not see fit to brief the
"equivocal request for counsel" issues on
appeal, it argued below that defendant's
subsequent statement that he was "willing to
get it over with" was sufficient to clarify his
position and to demonstrate a waiver of his
right to counsel.17 We disagree.
This case is similar to United States v.
Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (mem.), and State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho
880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1983), which
were favorably cited by this court in Griffin.
In Prestigiacomo, the interrogator did not
clarify the defendant's equivocal request for
counsel. 504 F. Supp. at 682. Instead, he
asked defendant whether he would continue to
answer questions. Id. After receiving an affirmative response, he proceeded to interrogate
him. Id. The court in that case found the
interrogator had given "the impression that
what defendant said would not be treated as a
sign, albeit an equivocal one, that he wished a
lawyer." Id. at 684. That tactic was improper
and, consequently, the court suppressed the
statements which resulted from further interrogation. Id.
In Moulds, the defendant made an equivocal request for counsel. 673 P.2d at 1083.
Instead of clarifying the request, the interrogator recognized defendant's right, informed
defendant that the decision was his to make,
and then proceeded to discuss the case with
defendant. Id. Thereafter, the defendant made
incriminating remarks. Id. The Idaho court
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found that defendant's "statements were the
products of interrogation continued at the
instance of the police after the right to counsel
had been invoked/ Id. at 1085. Consequently,
the court affirmed the suppression of the statements. Id.
The fatal flaw in both Prestigiacomo and
Moulds was the failure to cease interrogation
except for the very limited purpose of clarifying whether defendant wished to assert his
right to counsel. The fact that defendant
continued to answer questions was not a sufficient indication that he was abandoning his
right to counsel. In contrast, Griffin serves as
an example of a valid waiver of Miranda
rights following clarification of an ambiguous
reference to counsel. In Griffin, defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights, which he
waived. 754 P.2d at 966. However, during the
ensuing interview there came a time when he
said, "I'm calling an attorney." Id. The interrogating officer immediately asked, "OK, are
you saying you don't want to talk anymore?"18
Id. at 966-67. Defendant's response indicated he would continue to talk to the detective at that time, but planned to talk to an
attorney later. Id. at 967. Thus, although the
conviction in Griffin was reversed on other
grounds, further interrogation following the
clarifying exchange just described was held not
violative of defendant's Miranda rights.
Defendant's statement in this case included
a reference to an attorney which is properly
classed as an equivocal request for counsel.
Because Sgt. Elliot's warnings were the only
Miranda warnings which defendant received
before undergoing custodial interrogation, it
was necessary that someone clarify that equivocal request before defendant could be subjected to custodial interrogation. Defendant's
request was never clarified and, consequently,
the state failed to demonstrate a valid waiver
of defendant's right to counsel. The trial
court erred in holding to the contrary. We
accordingly reverse and remand for a new
trial.
Because the trial court concluded that defendant's Miranda rights had not been violated, the parties did not have occasion to
argue which evidence had to be excluded and
whether any exceptions to the exclusionary
rule might apply.19 On remand, the parties
must of course be allowed to argue these
various points. After entertaining these arguments, the trial court must exclude all primary
evidence elicited during the custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence derived
therefrom which is not saved by an exception
to the exclusionary rule. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431,441 (1984).
Our decision is a difficult one and will be a
source of consternation to many, who will
question why the state should be put to the
cost and burden of having to retry someone
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who clearly is guilty. But while the results in
particular cases may be unwelcome, "[t]he
fifth amendment exclusionary rule is clearly
dictated by the Constitution and is the only
possible means of protecting the values under l y i n g the p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f incrimination." M. Gardner, The Emerging
Good Faith Exception to the Miranda RuleA Critique, 35 Hastings L.J. 429, 466 (1984).
We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. These purposes were again repeated during the
exam, with even more specificity. Later in the exam,
Sgt. Elliot stated:
Okay, good, okay, uh, at the beginning
of the test I told you what the things
were that we needed to show. Number
one is that you did not arrange with
anyone to take the child but that you
haven't got someone taking care of her,
she is not hidden out and you are not
doing this to deprive Antoinette visitation of the child. And, uh, secondly,
you did nothing to injure the child and
you, and if she in fact is not alive, did
not cause her death, right?
2. It is not clear from the record why Sgt. Elliot
stated that he had to advise defendant of his rights
"again." It is clear, however, that the first and only
Miranda warnings defendant received prior to his
formal arrest were given by Sgt. Elliot at the outset
of the polygraph examination.
3. The specific inculpatory questions asked during
the examination were:
1) Have you caused the death of
Miyako?
2) Do you know where Miyako is hidden
now?
3) Have you arranged the disappearance
of Miyako?
4. It is not entirely clear why the sheriff did not give
defendant his Miranda warnings. Apparently,
however, he relied upon Sgt. Elliot's explanation
that defendant had been "Mirandized."
5. At least one Utah case has recognized
"preponderance of the evidence" as the appropriate
standard for determining the voluntariness of a
waiver of Miranda rights. See State v. Moore, 697
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). The preponderance standard is difficult to square with Miranda's holding
that the state bears a heavy burden, if counsel was
not present, to show a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has
adopted the "preponderance of the evidence" test in
evaluating Miranda waiver questions. Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515,523 (1986).
6. The court's comment on coercion represents a bit
of an overstatement in view of Miranda's recogni-
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tion that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. See 384 U.S. at 467.
7. Despite the court's phraseology in its remarks
from the bench, it is apparent from the record that
defendant never made any "subsequent requests" for
counsel after his statement to Sgt. Elliot.
8. Under certain circumstances, even defendants
who are told they are free to leave will nonetheless
be held to have been subjected to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F*2d
466,467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
9. According to the transcript of the polygraph
examination, the polygraph machine was attached to
defendant by two tubes encircling his trunk, finger
plates on his ring and index fingers, and a blood
pressure cuff on hisrightarm.
10. In view of the result we reach, we need not
decide in this case whether the polygraph examination as such was accusatory interrogation and
whether defendant was in custody from the inception of the exam. We note, however, that numerous
courts have leaned toward finding such examinations to be custodial, a view which seems to
command majority support and to be wellreasoned. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113,
477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (noting that strict
Miranda-type analysis is typically applied to polygraph confessions); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 439
Penn. 34, 264 A.2d 706, 707 (1970) (state's suggestion that defendant was not in custody for polygraph was "attempt to have (court] submerge [its]
intelligence"); State v. Fallcr, 111 N.W.2d 433, 435
(S.D. 1975) ("situation a lie detector test presents
can best be described as a psychological rubber
hose"); Creeks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex.
1976) (where investigation has focused on defendant, Miranda warnings required before polygraph);
People v. Carter, 1 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr.
546, 549 (1970) ("Questioning during the course of a
lie deteaor test certainly qualifies as a form of
custodial interrogation."), overruled on other
grounds, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr.
313 (1972). But see, e.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d
1346, 1352 (Del. 1980)("appearance at the police
station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver
of his Miranda rights"), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 910
(1982); People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356, 527
N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988) (willingness to aid in
investigation demonstrated that polygraph not custodial).
11. The state cites testimony to the effect that defendant did not consider himself under arrest even
after he was formally arrested, suggesting this
demonstrates that defendant could not have believed
he was in custody when he first confessed. This
evidence is at most a commentary on defendant's
acumen. Under the objective "reasonable person"
test, defendant's subjective belief about custody is
not relevant. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
442(1984).
12. But see note 10, supra. It is interesting to note
that the polygraph examiner considered Miranda
warnings at the outset of the polygraph examination
to be a necessity. He stated: "Because you are in the
cop shop there is no doubt in your mind that this is
the police station and, uh, because you are in taking
a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must
advise you of your rights ...." But see People v.
Sohn, 148 A.D.2d 553, 539 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (1989)
(mem.) (giving of Miranda
warnings was
"apparently out of an 'excess of caution' [and did]
not preclude a finding that [defendant] was not in
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custody").
Sergeant Elliot's approach, whether or not legally
required, surely seems prudent, if for no other
reason than that it forecloses the possibility a
suspect will blurt out a confession after his deception has been ascertained but before Miranda warnings can be issued. Moreover, as an arm of the
state, the police have a responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on
the side of giving the Miranda warnings before they
are strictly required advances that function, as well
as minimizes the risk that important evidence will be
excluded because the warnings were not given early
enough in the process.
13. As indicated previously, Sheriff Hayward apparently relied upon Sgt. Elliot's claim that defendant had been properly "Mirandized" at the commencement of the polygraph exam. Although
Sheriff Hayward, out of the same abundance of
caution that may have motivated Sgt. Elliot, should
ideally have given new Miranda warnings to defendant prior to interrogating him, the earlier warnings
would have sufficed had Sgt. Elliot elicited a clear
waiver of those rights from defendant at that time. See
State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah
1979) (the law does not require repetition of Miranda
rights within a short period of time and a
continuous sequence of events even though defendant's status may actually change in the interim).
The state did not argue that Sheriff Hayward's
"good faith" reliance upon Sgt. Elliot's claim he
previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an
exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we
note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth
Amendment area, courts have declined to create a
"good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth
Amendment. United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540,
1544 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("once a suspect
has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that
request is imputed to all law enforcement officers
who subsequently deal with the suspect"). See also
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101 (1988)
(implicitly rejecting "good faith" argument); White
v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982)
(declining to create exception absent clear indication
from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984).
An excellent treatment of a possible "good faith"
exception to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule
is found in M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith
Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35
Hastings L.J. 429 (1984). Professor Gardner concludes:
While there may be reason to doubt the
constitutional necessity of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, the fifth
amendment privilege is itself a constitutionally required exclusionary rule.
Whereas a fourth amendment violation
occurs at the moment of the unlawful
privacy violation, violations of the privilege against self-incrimination do not
occur unless and until the government
uses the tainted evidence against the
defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Although alternatives to the exclusionary
rule might conceivably be developed to
protect fourth amendment privacy interests, no alternative could possibly
protect the fifth amendment values of
maintaining an accusatorial system and
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cation. Finally, other courts have not found a
respecting the dignity of criminal defewaiver where the defendant has signed a waiver
ndants. If use of compelled selfform immediately after an unclarified, equivocal
incriminating evidence is permitted, the
reference to counsel. See, e.g., United States v.
fifth amendment's protection is destrPrestigiacomo,
504 F. Supp. 681, 682-84
oyed.
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.). Cf. United States v.
/d. at 462-63.
Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T)he
14. We note that defendant was given a second set
police may not use a statement a suspect makes
of Miranda warnings after he had informed Sheriff
after an equivocal request for counsel, but before
Hayward that his daughter was dead, gone with the
the request is clarified, as an effective waiver of the
police to American Fork to retrieve the body, been
right to counsel."). Especially in this case, that
arrested, and been returned to Salt Lake City.
approach makes sense. Once defendant made an
Apparently recognizing that by that time all the
equivocal reference to counsel, as explained in the
damage had been done, the state does not argue the
text Sgt. Elliot could properly do only one thingsecond set of Miranda warnings are of any conseqseek clarification. Instead, he concluded that defeuence to our analysis. Defendant, on the other
ndant was "not worried," that they should "proceed
hand, argues that because he had previously invoked
... and get it over with ....," and he submitted the
his right to counsel, albeit equivocally; had not been
written form to defendant for signature. In effect,
provided an attorney; and had not initiated any
submission of the written form to defendant was an
subsequent interrogation with the police, the fruits
integral part of Sgt. Elliot's conduct which was at
of the post-arrest interrogations must also be
odds with his duty to clarify and as such, the
suppressed. We agree. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451
written form cannot be taken as clarifying defenU.S. 477 (1981), the United States Supreme Court
dant's equivocal request.
held that once a defendant has invoked his right to
18. The main problem inherent in the clarification
counsel, statements made without counsel in subseapproach is "the additional opportunity given to law
quent interrogations initiated by the police, even
enforcement officials to ... [usej clarifying questions
when pursuant to renewed Miranda warnings, must
to dissuade" suspects from asserting their right to
be suppressed. Id. at 484-87. See also State v.
counsel. The Notre Dame Note at 472. See AndeMoore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985) (accused
must initiate conversation). The rule in Edwards rson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1984);
Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 1982)
applies even more forcefully in a case such as this
(permissible for officer to "seek clarification of the
where the subsequent interrogation is prompted by,
and designed to explain, information which has suspect's desires, as long as he does not disguise the
clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or intimicome to the police as a direct result of an earlier
dation"). See also Thompson v. Wainwright, 601
Miranda violation.
F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (during purported
15. "Equivocal request" appears to be an imprecise
term in this context. Many of the references to att- effort to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining
orneys which are held to be equivocal requests for counsel may not be in defendant's best interest);
counsel are not requests at all. It may be preferable Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska Ct.
to refer to such statements as "equivocal references App. 1985) (during purported effort to clarify,
to an attorney." See, e.g., Note, The Right to officer emphasized delay and complexity of obtaining an attorney).
Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal
One commentator has suggested that only one
References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159
question should be permitted to seek clarification.
(1986) [hereinafter "The Vanderbilt Note"].
With our embellishment in the form of an introdu16. See The Vanderbilt Note at 1187 (clarification
ctory statement, that question is as follows: You
approach represents "a middle position").
17. The state also argued below that defendant's have been advised of your rights, including the right
signing the written waiver form, on the heels of his to have an attorney with you during this interview
even if you cannot afford to hire one. What you
"willing to get it over with" comment, clarified that
his position was to waive his right to counsel. At just said leads me to wonder whether or not you
least one court has accepted this argument. See State wish to avail yourself of that right. "Do you want
the assistance of [an attorney] at this time or do you
v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003
(1983). In Smith, the defendant signed a waiver agree to answer questions without the presence of
[an attorney]?" Comment, Equivocal Requests for
form subsequent to his equivocal reference to
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considecounsel and then proceeded to speak with the offirations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 782 (1987).
cers. Our Washington counterpart found those facts
19. The "independent source doctrine" and
sufficient to demonstrate a waiver on the part of the
"inevitable discovery rule" are among the exceptions
defendant.
to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Northrup, 756
We decline to adopt the Washington position for
P.2d 1288, 1292-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The
three reasons. First, we find the position inconsistent with the presumption against waiver. See Stare state had no occasion to argue either exception, on
appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to
v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987). Second,
determine whether either of these exceptions might
we have already noted that once a defendant
apply in this case to some of the evidence which
invokes his right to counsel, statements made in
might otherwise have to be suppressed.
subsequent interrogations, without counsel present
"The independent source doctrine allows admisand even if pursuant to renewed warnings, must also
sion of evidence that has been discovered by means
be suppressed unless defendant initiates the contact.
wholly independent of any constitutional violation."
See note 14, supra. If police cannot circumvent the
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). Thus,
rule through renewed Miranda warnings days after a
any evidence which was discovered apart from defrequest for counsel, we see no reason to allow them
to do so through a simple waiver form given on the endant's statements made during custodial interrogation need not be excluded.
heels of the equivocal reference without any clarifiThe inevitable discovery rule allows the admission
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of evidence as long as "the prosecution can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. See, e.g.,
People v. Freeman, 739 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1987) (body of deceased victim was so conspicuously located that discovery was inevitable); State
v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 (1985)
(hotel maid would inevitably have discovered body
of deceased victim within 56 hours of actual discovery and reported discovery to police), cert, denied,
475 U.S. 1141 (1986). Under this rule, the prosecution must show that the evidence "would" have been
discovered, not simply that it "could" or "might"
have been discovered. Miller, 709 P.2d at 242. See also
United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704
(10th Cir. 1982). It is altogether unclear from the
record before us how much, if any, of the evidence
discovered as a result of the improper custodial
interrogation would inevitably have been discovered.
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GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff Robert E. Conger appeals from an
adverse jury verdict on negligence, and the
trial court's directed verdict striking down his
strict product liability claim against defendant
Tel Tech. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 1979, Conger's employer,
Meadow Gold, purchased a milk tanker from
Western General Dairies. The tanker had two
eliptical stainless steel tanks used for transporting milk. A ladder led to the top of each
tank. It was Conger's responsibility to collect
raw milk with the tanker from several dairy
farms and take it to Meadow Gold's processing plant in Salt Lake City. After the milk
was pumped out of the tanks, he would clean
the inside of each tank. He did this by clim-

Iv. Rep. 21
£i
bing down into the tanks through an access
hatch on each tank and scrubbing the inside
with a special brush and detergents.
In May 1979, Meadow Gold entered into an
oral agreement with Tel Tech, wherein Tel
Tech was to sell and install a cleaning mechanism in the milk tanker. The mechanism
consisted of two spray balls, one for each
tank, welded to the top of each tank. By attaching a hose to the spray balls, cleaning and
rinsing solutions could then be pumped into
the tanks without the necessity of anyone climbing inside. The spray balls were placed on
top of each tank opposite the ladders, requiring the operator to walk across the top of the
tanker from the ladders to the spray balls to
attach the hoses. Tel Tech did not install any
type of walk protection across the top of the
tanker and did not advise Meadow Gold to do
so, nor did Meadow Gold inquire about safety
measures.
On January 1, 1981, Conger stepped over
the tanker's hatch to attach a hose to the
spray ball, slipped on a spot of grease or milk
fat, and fell from the tanker, suffering serious
injuries. He had used the spray balls regularly
for over a year without mishap, between three
and four hundred times. He had also complained to Meadow Gold management that using
the spray balls was unsafe because of the fall
hazard.
Conger filed a complaint, naming Tel Tech
and others as defendants. The claims against
all other defendants were settled. The claim
against Tel Tech proceeded to trial. Conger
presented evidence on theories of negligence
and strict product liability. There was a
dispute as to whether Conger should be
allowed to present a strict liability theory
because the pleadings contained only a negligence claim. However, the trial judge gave
Conger leave to amend the pleadings and
concluded that Tel Tech, through the course
of discovery, had sufficient notice of Conger's
strict liability theory to justify amending the
pleadings.
After all the evidence was presented, the
court granted Tel Tech's motion for a directed
verdict against Conger's strict liability claim,
so only submitted the negligence claim to the
jury. The court instructed the jury to disregard
evidence relating to Conger's strict product
liability theory. In response to specific interrogatories, the jury concluded that neither Tel
Tech nor Conger was negligent.
Conger appeals, primarily on the grounds
that (1) the court improperly dismissed his
product liability claim; and (2) the court's
jury instructions were vague and confusing,
thus creating the necessity for a new trial on
the negligence theory as well.
DIRECTED VERDICT
In reviewing the directed verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to

UTAH AIWANCCE REPORTS

